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Penises, Nipples, and Bums, Oh My!: An
Examination of How Freedom of Expression
Applies to Public Nudity
CLARA GUTWEIN*
INTRODUCTION

How do you solve a problem like the nipple? A woman's nipples are
both erotic and utilitarian, obscene and maternal. She must never show
them in public. She must show them to feed her child. Nipples are for
men. Nipples are for babies. Nipples, it seems, are for everyone except a
woman herself. The law, too, has something to say about nipples. It is
completely constitutional for the government to prevent women from
publicly showing their nipples in order to protect morality and public
order. 1 Thus, the law assumes an inversely proportional relationship
between the number of publicly exposed nipples and the strength of a
community's moral standards.
Despite the First Amendment's deep concern for protecting counter
majoritarian speech and minority points of view,2 recent cases have
* Clara Gutwein is a native of Indianapolis, Indiana. She received her bachelor's
degree in medieval and renaissance studies at Barnard College, Columbia University,
where she specialized in medieval religious history. Clara has a Master of Studies in
medieval history from Oriel College, Oxford University, where she wrote her dissertation
on the vita apostolica in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. After completing her master's
degree, Clara turned away from the life of the mind and decided instead to pursue a life in
the law. She is a Lauren Robel Scholar at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law,
where she is an Executive Competition Coordinator on the Sherman Minton Executive
Advocacy Board and an Executive Articles Editor for the Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies. Clara would like to dedicate her note to two women: Saint Claire of Assisi, who
lifted up herself and her sisters up through humility, and Beyonce, who reminds us all
that "a winner don't quit on themselves."
1. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1991) (holding Indiana's
requirement that dancers wear pasties and a G-string when performing did not violate the
dancer's First Amendment rights).
2. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that
nonviolent activities are entitled to First Amendment protection); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that a statute that alleged to punish advocacy and forbid
assembly with others to advocate the action fails under the First Amendment); Edwards v.
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shown that the full freedom of speech does not extend to women who
wish to repossess the nipple's narrative. 3 By exposing their breasts in
public, these women attempted to use their nipples as a form of
symbolic speech and communicate their antipathy towards laws that
sexualize the female body.4 But the laws that sexualized their breasts
also silenced their nipples, and these cases both ended in courts denying
First Amendment protection to topless protests.
America is not the only jurisdiction that does not have an answer to
the legal conundrum of public nudity as protest speech. One man
recently challenged the United Kingdom and European Union through
his single-minded determination to undermine centuries worth of
custom and convince people to embrace public nudity. Steven Gough,
the so-called "naked rambler," has made it his mission to use his own
naked body as an instrument of protest against inherited social norms
hostile to public nudity. 5 His assertion that his public nudity is a form of
expression that merits protection under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (officially called the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) raises critical
questions about how legal systems ought to treat civil liberties that
challenge social norms and traditional standards of morality.6
The two US cases that challenged the First Amendment's treatment·
of the female nipple, Tagami v. City of Chicago and Free the Nipple v.
City of Fort Collins, were instructive in their absolute failure. 7 The
courts in both cases applied long-established tests to determine whether
topless protests amounted to symbolic speech with full First
Amendment protection. The specifics of the tests themselves, as well as
how the courts applied them, demonstrated the predetermined futility
of the plaintiffs' plight. Within the context of symbolic speech, the
female nipple uniquely challenges existing legal standards by both its
multifaceted cultural identity and its physical limitations. Yet, instead
of acknowledging that existing standards of symbolic speech do not
account for the nipple's particular limitations, the courts in both cases
allowed the law to trap the nipple in a self-perpetuating cycle of
unprotected speech.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that a criminal conviction for making others
angry cannot stand under the First Amendment).
3. See Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 2017); Free the Nipple v.
City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1263 (D. Colo. 2016).
4. Id.
5. Jennifer Agate, Gough v. Unit.ed Kingdom-"Naked Rambler" Tests the Boundaries
of Free Speech, 26 ENT. L. REV. 62, 62 (2015) (discussing Stephen Gough's case before the
European Union Court of Human Rights).
6. Id. at 62.
7. See generally Tagami, 875 F. 3d 375; Free the Nipple, 216 F. Supp. 1258.
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This note will begin by exploring the two recent legal challenges to
the First Amendment's treatment of the female nipple. Both cases
emerged out of the plaintiffs' reactions to local public-nudity ordinances
and their dissatisfaction with laws that legalized disparate treatment of
male and female bodies. The courts' treatment of both cases only
validated the plaintiffs' arguments that the law does not treat female
bodies with careful and unbiased consideration.8 ·Second, this note will
examine two legal tests cited by the courts in their rejection of the
plaintiffs' claims that topless protests are constitutionally protected
symbolic speech. These are the Spence test, which controls what
expression counts as symbolic speech, 9 and the O'Brien test, which
controls whether the government may suppress symbolic speech. 10 This
note will also consider the legal struggles of Steven Gough and his
unwavering commitment to changing general attitudes towards public
nudity. The third section will consider two cases involving Gough: one in
which the United Kingdom sought to impose criminal sanctions against
him, and another which Gough brought before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), in which he challenged the UK government's
treatment of his right to freedom of expression. Finally, this note will
analyze the problems with the US courts' treatment of First
Amendment protections related to the female nipple and the similar
flaws in the way the European Union and UK government handle nude
protests.
The goal of this note is not to suggest that women could end, or even
significantly influence, the patriarchal pallor of American culture if only
they were allowed to show their nipples in public, nor that a single man
can change centuries of inherited prejudice against public nudity.
Indeed, the author remains agnostic regarding the value of topless and
nude protests and whether they are sufficiently expressive to warrant
First Amendment or Article 10 protection. However, regardless of
whether the courts should recognize topless protests to be symbolic
speech or nude protests to be socially permissible, both the American
and European courts must assess the merits of such claims fairly.
Under the present metrics for symbolic speech and freedom of
expression, both court systems clearly do not treat the nipple or the
naked body fairly. Therefore, this note aims to demonstrate that under
the current legal standards for evaluating First Amendment claims,
women will never have the opportunity to use their nipples to make
statements about entrenched cultural sexism because that entrenched
sexism has already permeated First Amendment jurisprudence, and
8. Id.
9. See infra note 56.
10. See infra note 78.
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that similarly conservative thinking is baked into the European right 'to
freedom of expression.

I. Two TOPLESS PROTESTS
Taking one's top off to say something is an unusual method of
communication. But within the last five years, a growing number of
women have looked to this untraditional method as the most effective
means of protesting institutionalized gender inequality. 11 In two recent
cases, the plaintiffs argued that the First Amendment ought to protect
women's right to publicly expose their nipples as an act of political
protest emerged out of related circumstances. In each case, the female
plaintiffs argued that city ordinances prohibiting public female
toplessness violated both their First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.12 As
this note will explore, in both cases, the courts used established tests of
symbolic speech to reject the women's claims.

Tagami v. City of Chicago
On August 24, 2014, Sonoku Tagami celebrated "GoTopless Day
2014" by walking around the streets of Chicago nude from the waist up,
covering her bare breasts with nothing but strategically applied
"opaque" body paint. 13 "GoTopless Day'' is "an annual protest organized
by GoTopless, Inc., a nonprofit organization that advocates on behalf of
a woman's right to bare her breasts in public." 14 Predictably, the
Chicago police issued Tagami a citation for public indecency, enforcing a
city ordinance that prohibited "any female person" from publicly
displaying "any portion of the breast at or below the upper edge of the
areola thereof . . . not covered by an opaque covering." 15 Tagami
unsuccessfully contested the citation before a hearing officer who found
her guilty of violating the public-nudity ordinance and ordered her to
pay a one hundred dollar fine. 16 Undeterred, Tagami filed suit against
the City of Chicago, alleging that the city's public-nudity ordinance

11. Sophie Heawood, #FreeTheNipple: Liberation or Titillation?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
6, 2015, 11:23 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/apr/06/free-the-nipple
liberation-photos-breasts.
12. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377; Free the Nipple, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1259-60.
13. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377.
14. Id.
15. CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-8-080 (2002).
16. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377.
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unconstitutionally violated her First Amendment right to free speech
and her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. 17
The district court judge originally dismissed Tagami's equal
protection claim but allowed her First Amendment claim to go
forward. 18 After Tagami amended her original complaint, the district
court reversed its previous ruling and dismissed both claims, entering
final judgement for the City. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit Court heard Tagami's appeal, but ultimately
affirmed the district court's holding.20
Arguing before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Tagami
asserted that her public display of her breasts warranted First
Amendment protection because her nudity was part of a protest against
''laws that prevent women from appearing bare-chested in public."21 The
court began its analysis by noting that the First Amendment only
protects expressive conduct when the court considers that conduct to be
"inherently expressive." 22 To be "inherently expressive," the conduct
itself "must convey a message that can be readily 'understood by those
who view it."'23 The court applied this standard and found that
"[w]hatever her subjective intent, Tagami's public nudity did not itself
communicate a message of political protest." 24 To buttress this
conclusion, the court pointed out that Tagami's amended complaint did
not offer any facts to support its assertion that onlookers could readily
understand that her toplessness was intended to protest gender biased
public-nudity laws.25 The court further rejected toplessness as symbolic
speech by comparing Tagami's conduct with the flag burning at issue in
Texas u. Johnson.26 In contrast to the "overwhelmingly apparent,"
"expressive, overtly political nature" of the flag burning in Johnson, the
court was unpersuaded that it was '"overwhelmingly' apparent' that a
woman's act of baring her breasts m public expresses a political
message." 27

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
• 20. Id.
21. Id. at 378.
22. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
66 (2006)).
23. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406).

354

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 28:1

The court also analyzed Tagami's First Amendment claim under the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. O'Brien. 28 Tagami argued
that Chicago's public-nudity ordinance failed to satisfy the second prong
of the O'Brien test, which allows the government to censor symbolic
speech only if the censorship "furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest."29 In response, the city contended that it had a
"general interest in preserving health, safety, and traditional moral
norms" and that "more particularly . . . the ordinance protect[ed]
unwilling members of the public-especially children-from unwanted
exposure to nudity."30 The court was persuaded by the city's argument,
stating that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 31
The success of Tagami's argument turned on the question of
whether a woman's public display of her naked breasts is expressive
conduct sufficient to qualify as symbolic speech. In answering that
question, the court unquestioningly applied the standard tests as set out
in Johnson and O'Brien. 32 The court never considered whether there
might be fundamental differences between a flag and a breast. Nor did
the court challenge the city's arguments that it had an important
governmental interest in enforcing its ban on public female toplessness,
despite the city's failure to explain why the breasts of nursing mothers
do not pose a threat to "unwilling members of the public"33 who might
catch a glimpse. Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit's opinion
suggests that any assertion of First Amendment protection for topless
protests will almost inevitably fail, the opinion also reveals that this
failure is due as much to judicial laziness as to First Amendment
doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit's approach illustrates the uphill battle women
face when advocating for the right to protest topless. As the next case
will make clear, the Seventh Circuit is not alone in its unwillingness to
consider why current standards for symbolic conduct are ill-suited to
consider the value of speech communicated through nipples.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 378-79 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 378 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
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Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins
In the summer of 2015, several members of the non-profit Free the
Nipple decided it was time to speak up about Fort Collins's public
nudity ordinance. 34 Specifically, the women took issue with the
ordinance's provision that "no person shall knowingly appear in any
public place in a nude state or state of undress, such that ...the breast
or breasts of a female are exposed."35 To protest the ordinance's
disparate treatment of male and female breasts, the women stood at an
intersection in downtown Fort Collins and took their tops off. 36 To
ensure that they did not violate the law, the women covered their
nipples and breasts with "opaque dressings."37
The city government took swift action against the women's public
display of their nipples.38 The Fort Collins City Council passed an
ordinance modifying the existing public-nudity statute.39 The new
statute prohibited any "female who is ten years of age or older" from
"knowingly appear[ing] in any public place with her breast exposed
below the top of the areola and nipple while located in a public right of
way ...or any other public place, or on private property if the person is
in a place that can be viewed from the ground level" by someone who did
not take "extraordinary steps" to peep through the window.40
The city's amendment to the public nudity ordinance did not satisfy
the topless protesters. Two of those protestors, along with Free the
Nipple, brought suit against the City of Fort Collins. The plaintiffs
alleged that the ordinance discriminated against females and LGBTQIA
individuals in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, and further that it violated the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause.41 To support their claims, and to demonstrate that
the ordinance targeted their "expressive activity," the plaintiffs quoted
from several email exchanges between Fort Collins citizens and city
officials. 42 These exchanges included a statement by a city councilor
34. Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F.Supp. 3d 1258, 1259-60 (D. Colo.
2016).
35. FORT COLLINS, COLO. MUN. CODE § 17-142 (2015) (amended by FORT COLLINS,
COLO. ORDINANCE 111 (September 2019) to eliminate prohibition on exposure of the
female breast).
36. See Free the Nipple, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1260.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. FORT COLLINS, COLO. ORDINANCE 134 (Nov. 2015) (amending FORT COLLINS, Co.
MUN. CODE§ 17-142 (2015)).
41. Free the Nipple, 216 F. Supp. 3d, at 1259-60.
42. Id. at 1261.
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explaining to a citizen that he planned to vote in favor of the ordinance
''because allowing women to appear topless at public places would
denigrate a woman's respect and value."43 Other quoted statements
included expressions from city officials condemning public female
toplessness as morally corrosive.44
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado was
unmoved by the plaintiffs' contention that the city's ordinance impinged
upon their freedom of speech.45 The court determined that appearing
topless in public was not "protected speech" under the First Amendment
because to merit such protection the conduct in question must "(1).
intend to convey a 'particularized message' and (2) must demonstrate
that there is a great 'likelihood . . . that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."'46 The court allowed that "there is
no debate that plaintiffs meet the first prong of that test."47 The court
was not convinced, however, that the plaintiffs' conduct could meet the
test's second prong. Specifically, the court found that there was not "a
great likelihood that their nudity's message about the sexualized nature
of certain laws is likely to be understood by those who view [the
protestors] topless in public."48 To support this conclusion, the court
pointed to "a persuasive amount of case law suggest[ing]that public
nudity itself is not inherently expressive of any particular message."49
The court further bolstered its conclusion by citing the Supreme Court's
reasoning that "if [what] the specific message of one's nudity is meant to
convey would not be understood without accompanying explanatory
speech, that is 'strong evidence that the conduct at issue ... is not so
inherently expressive that it warrants protection."' 50
Unlike the Tagami court, the Free the Nipple court did not analyze
the plaintiffs' argument under the O'Brien test. Although the city 'did
argue that "topless bans such as Section 17-142 are constitutionally
permissible regulations under the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v.
O'Brien," because the court first held that "topless protests do not
constitute protected speech," it saw no reason to apply the O'Brien
test.51 Like the opinion in Tagami, the Colorado district court's
approach to the First Amendment's protection of topless protests
43. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1262-64.
46. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411-12 (1974)).
47. Id. at 1262.
48. Id. at 1263.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1263 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 66 (2006)).
51. Id. at 1262.
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underscores the great weight of the case law against finding female
nudity to be protected speech. Indeed, the Free the Nipple court was so
convinced by this wealth of case law that it engaged in even less
analysis than the Tagami court.
Notably, the court denied the city's motion to dismiss Free the
Nipple's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. 52 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's holding in
Free the Nipple, thereby creating a circuit split on the question of the
constitutionality of public-nudity ordinances that treat male and female
breasts differently. In response to the Tenth Circuit's decision, the City
of Fort Collins dropped the lawsuit, and agreed to change the
ordinance.53
The courts' decisions in both Tagami and Free the Nipple were
guided by well-established case law on symbolic speech. The intricacies
of this case law are the essential starting point for understanding why
current First Amendment law traps topless protests within the category
of minimally protected speech. This note will now turn to the two tests
that have come to form the foundation of symbolic speech: Spence and

O'Brien.

II. SYMBOLIC SPEECH
When individuals communicate a message through nonverbal
conduct, courts assess whether the First Amendment protects that
conduct by evaluating it under the standards of symbolic speech. The
broad parameters of symbolic speech predate the Spence and O'Brien
tests. 54 But the two tests distill the questions that most concern the
courts: (1) are the speaker's actions inherently expressive, and (2) does
the government's interference with those actions violate the speaker's
First Amendment rights. Some commentators argue that symbolic
conduct is itseJf a specious concept. Professor Louis Henkin asserts that
"[s]peech is conduct, and actions speak . . . . [The] meaningful
constitutional distinction is not between words and conduct, but
between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of

52. See id. at 1264.
53. Pete Williams, Topless Women Win Big as Colorado City Drops Ban, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2019, 6:53 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/topless-women
win-big-colorado-city-drops-ban-nl 056701?cid=referral_taboolafeed.
54. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding that wearing a black armband in protest of the Vietnam War was protected
symbolic speech); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a silent sit-in
protest of public library segregation was protected symbolic �peech).
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conduct." 55 But the courts continue to distinguish between verbal speech
and symbolic conduct, imposing more lenient standards on the latter to
determine whether the government may encroach upon the conduct at
issue. This section will discuss the Spence and O'Brien tests, the
circumstances that led to their adoption, and the reverberations of their
impact on symbolic speech.
The Spence Test

In the summer of 1970, college student Harold Spence hung an
American flag from the window of his Seattle apartment.56 To protest
against the United States' invasion of Cambodia and the killings at
Kent State University, both of which had occurred only a few days prior,
he used black tape to create a peace sign on the flag.57 Spence displayed
his modified flag upside down to further express his political
grievances. 58 Three Seattle police officers promptly seized the flag and
arrested Spence, charging him under Washington's "improper use "
statute. 59 The statute prohibited anyone from publicly displaying an
American flag that had been imprinted with any word, figure, mark,
picture, design, drawing or advertisement.60
The issue of whether the First Amendment protected Spence's
modification of the American flag eventually came before the Supreme
Court of the United States. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that
Spence's message was "direct, likely to be understood, and within the
contours of the First Amendment."61 The Court noted that Spence's
protest was "a pointed expression of anguish ...about the then-current
domestic and foreign affairs of his government." 62 More significant still
was the Court's determination that Spence's upside down display of his
modified flag demonstrated "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."63
The Court did not formulate this finding as an explicit test. However,
subsequent cases took up the Spence court's analysis and used it to craft

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Louis Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968).
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 410
Id. at 410-11.
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a test for determining whether expressive conduct amounted to First
Amendment-protected symbolic speech.
The Court's landmark decision in Texas v. Johnson solidified the
Spence test as the authoritative metric for assessing symbolic speech.64
During the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory Johnson
participated in a demonstration in front of the Dallas City Hall, where
he "unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on
fire." 65 AB the flag burned, Johnson's fellow demonstrators chanted
"America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." 66 Like it had done in
Spence, in Johnson the Court evaluated whether the First Amendment
protected an individual's right to desecrate the American flag as an act
of political protest.67 Integral to the Court's conclusion that the First
Amendment does protect political acts of flag desecration was its initial
finding that Johnson's flag burning was symbolic speech.68
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated that "[i]n deciding
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked
whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."'69 Justice Brennan noted that the
Court had applied the Spence test to assess a wide variety of expressive
activities, including "students' wearing of black armbands to protest
American military involvement in Vietnam," "sit-in by blacks in a
'whites only' area to protest segregation," "the wearing of American
military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American
involvement in Vietnam," and "picketing about a wide variety of
causes," not to mention a number of other flag-desecration cases.70
The Court had little difficulty concluding that Johnson's flag
burning was symbolic speech.71 Brennan described the American flag as
"[p]regnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this
Nation as does the combination of letters found in 'America."'72
However, not all actions involving the flag are automatically
expressive.73 Rather, the context in which the individual desecrated the
flag is integral to deciding "whether the likelihood was great that the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-10 (1989).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 400.
See id. at 405-06.
Id. at 404. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 403-06.
Id. at 405.
Id.
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message would be understood by those who viewed it." 74 The Court
pointed to the circumstances in Spence as an example, noting that
"Spence's taping of a peace sign to his flag was 'roughly simultaneous
with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the
Kent State tragedy."'75 The Court deemed the circumstances of
Johnson's flag burning to be similarly conducive to others
understanding the message of his protest. 76 Indeed, the Court found
that because Johnson timed his protest to coincide with the Republican
National Convention, "[t]he expressive, overtly political nature of this
conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent." 77
Spence and Johnson demonstrate that flag burning has had an
outsized impact on the jurisprudence of symbolic speech. Johnson took
the ideas first articulated by the Court in Spence and formalized them
into a simple test that has since become the starting point for analyzing
symbolic speech. As this note discusses below, the cogency of the Spence
test belies the limits of its practical scope. The idiosyncrasies of flag
desecration left an indelible mark upon the Spence test, rendering it
inflexible in the face of symbolic speech that is not enacted upon
inherently expressive material objects. This rigidity enables judges to
interpret the Spence test's limitations to bar forms of potentially
symbolic speech that exist outside of flag burning's narrow parameters.
U.S. v. O'Brien

On the morning of March 31, 1966, David O'Brien burned his
selective service registration card in front of a sizable crowd on the steps
of the South Boston courthouse. 78 Shortly after this display, FBI agents
arrested O'Brien for violating the 1965 Amendment to the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, which forbade the willful destruction
of a selective service form. 79 At his trial, O'Brien defended his actions by
telling that jury that he was only trying to influence others to
"reevaluate their position with Selective Service, with the armed forces,"
and to "reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully
consider [his] position." 80 He further argued that the amendment under
which he had been arrested was unconstitutional "because it was

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
Id. at 405 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410).
See id. at 405-06.
Id. at 406.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968).
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
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enacted to abridge free speech, and because it served no legitimate
purpose."81
O'Brien's case ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court.
O'Brien defended his First Amendment claims by arguing that his act of
burning his registration certificate was "symbolic speech," and that the
First Amendment protects all modes of "communi�ation of ideas by
conduct."82 The Court unequivocally rejected O'Brien's arguments. In an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court cautioned that it
"cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea." 83 Furthermore, the Court stated
that even if O'Brien's actions amounted to symbolic speech, "it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity."84 A government regulation may be
sufficiently justified in limiting an individual's freedom of speech if the
regulation:
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.85
The court held that the 1965 Amendment to the Universal Military
Training and Service Act met all of these requirements, and
consequently, that O'Brien's conviction did not violate his First
Amendment rights. 86
O'Brien represents an intermediate standard of scrutiny somewhat
below what the government would have to satisfy under strict
scrutiny. 87 Thus, it stands for the principle that the Court does not
subject governmental limitations on symbolic speech to the same
standards it applies to content or viewpoint-based limitations. This
difference is significant, because it allows the government to censor
actions to a degree that it cannot censor pure speech. So long as the
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 376.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 377.
86. Id.
87. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000).
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government's interest satisfies the O'Brien test, state actors have a
much greater latitude to encroach upon particular viewpoints and
content forms. As this note will discuss below, this is particularly true
when the courts evaluate women's public display of their nipples.

III. STEPHEN GoUGH, NUDIST HERO
The question of how to treat public nudity as an act of speech is not
confined to the United States, nor is it confined to the female nipple. For
many years, the Englishman Stephen Gough rambled across the United
Kingdom, traipsing along in the nude.88 Indeed, Gough became so
notorious as to earn the nickname, "the naked rambler."89 Like the
plaintiffs in Tagami and Free the Nipple, Gough asserted that his public
exposure was a form of expressive speech intended to communicate a
message with critical human rights implications for all. 90 He has
consistently argued that the human body is not indecent, and that the
law should not require people to behave as if it is.91 This note examines
two important cases involving Gough and his naked crusade. The first,
Gough v. DPP, was the United Kingdom's 2013 action against Gough. 92
The second, Gough v. United Kingdom, is Gough's suit against the
United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR).93 Together, the two cases illustrate persistent legal attitudes
towards public nudity and the legal impossibility of fighting those
attitudes and laws through expressive conduct.

Gough v. DPP
In 2013, after almost a decade of being in and out of prison for his
unsheathed escapades, the Calderdale Magistrates Court in Halifax
found Gough guilty of violating section 5 of the Public Order Act of 1986
(the 1986 Act).94 The 1986 Act prohibits a person from using
"threatening [or abusive] words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour ...
within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment,

88. See generally Gough v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2013] EWHC (Adm.in) 3267 (Eng.)
(noting Gough's staunch and relentless advocacy for nudity over years).
89. Agate, supra note 5 (discussing Stephen Gough's case before the European Union
Court of Human Rights).
90. Gough v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2013] EWHC (Adm.in) 3267.
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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alarm or distress thereby."95 This 2013 conviction resulted from Gough's
publicly nude walk out of the Halifax police station following his release
for a similar infraction. As Gough crossed through the Halifax town
center, multiple people reported that they were "alarmed and
distressed," as well as "disgusted" to see Gough in his full glory.96
Making his case before a judge, Gough argued that his persistent public
nudity was an essential element of his freedom of expression, and that,
by appearing publicly nude, he was campaigning for human rights.97
Gough's framing of his public exposure as an act of expression
intended to promote human rights complicated the British court
system's analysis of his case. Much like the topless women protesting
gender-biased laws in Tagami and Free the Nipple, Gough's case
problematized the issue of public nudity by forcing the courts to
consider whether public nudity can be so fundamentally expressive as to
invalidate legal prohibitions against it. Indeed, Gough maintained that
his nakedness "is a viewpoint to which he is entitled to give public
expression." 98 Specifically, Gough argued that the judge should have
allowed him to present examples of places and situations where nudity
is permissible and commonplace, and that it was error not to consider
these examples because they strengthened Gough's position that his
nudity was reasonable and therefore did not violate the 1986 Act.99
While he conceded that some onlookers might be distressed upon seeing
his public displays of nudity, Gough maintained that these people were
simply prejudiced. He told the judge that "he would continue to walk
naked until adverse reaction to this stops and that his aim was to be
accepted as are others who campaign for human rights." 100 Gough also
claimed that the government had violated his rights under Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights when it denied him the
right to express his position on public nudity.101 In support of this claim,
he asserted that the law does not proscribe public nudity, and that there
was no pressing social need for the law to do so. 102
However, like the American courts in Tagami and Free the Nipple,
the British courts were unconvinced by Gough's arguments.
The court held that Gough had indeed violated the 1986 Act
because his nude rambling was "insulting'' and also "threatening in that

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Public Order Act 1986, c. 64, §5(1) (Eng.).
Gough v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 3267.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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it caused [one of the witnesses] to feel at risk." 103 Additionally, the court
found that Gough's behavior "could also be described as abusive and
disorderly as it contributed to a breakdown of peaceful and law-abiding
behavior as evidenced by the reactions of the public to [his] public
display of nudity."104 Although the judge agreed that Gough's rights
under Article 10 were implicated, and that being naked in public was a
form of expression, the judge nevertheless held that the government's
actions were necessary and proportionate. 105 The court agreed with the
lower court's holding that, despite the expressive potential of public
nudity and the fact that public nudity is not itself a criminal offense,
there was "a pressing social need for the restriction of [Gough's] right to
be naked" in the Halifax city center. The court invoked the need to
balance Gough's right to express his point of view against the rights of
the majority "to enjoy a shared public space without being caused
distress and upset." 106 It concluded that Gough was fully aware that
walking through a town fully naked would violate public order and that
the sight of his nakedness would cause many onlookers distress or
alarm. 107 Finally, the court found that Gough was being deliberately
provocative in order to further his own cause, something that the law
did not support. 108 The fact that the law did not prevent Gough from
being naked in permissible locations, like nude beaches, and only
prevented him from exposing himself in public considerably
strengthened the government's case. 109 Therefore, the court held that
Gough's actions did violate the 1986 Act and that the government had
not infringed upon his Article 10 rights.110
Although Gough made various arguments challenging the
government's treatment of his public nude protests, the court's holding
against him largely turned on its finding that the public had a right to
expect that other people remain clothed while in public spaces.
Interestingly, the court did not attempt to justify its position by pointing
to a particular law. Rather, it invoked cultural norms to demonstrate
that it was Gough, and not those people disgusted and alarmed by his
nudity, who was acting unreasonably, and therefore, criminally. In this
sense, the English and American laws differ. However, as this note will

103.
104.
105.
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107.
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explore below, both legal systems allow social norms to trump people's
ability to use nudity as a form of protest.

Gough v. United Kingdom
Gough brought this case before the ECtHR in 2011.m He alleged
that the English government's treatment of him-repeatedly arresting
and imprisoning him for his refusal to wear clothing in public-mounted
to a violation of his rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.112 The UK
government successfully argued that Gough had no right to bring
certain of his complaints before the ECtHR because of administrative
requirements with which he had failed to comply.113 Therefore, because
the government had denied Gough leave to appeal this particular
sentence, the only issue before the ECtHR was the legality of Gough's
December 2011 conviction for breach of the peace.1 14 In .this case, like
the one before the English courts, Gough forced the law to consider
whether the human body's expressive capacities were sufficient to merit
protection under laws guaranteeing freedom of expression. Once again,
Gough was unsuccessful.
Arguing before the ECtHR, Gough maintained that he intended his
public nudity as a means of expressing his principled views on the
human body, and that therefore his nudity fell within Article lO's
definition of expression. 115 Central to Gough's case was Article lO's
broad definition of "expression," under which all citizens are guaranteed
"[t]he right to freedom of expression ...freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority regardless of frontiers."116 The ECtHR did not question the
sincerity or validity of Gough's efforts to change social attitudes towards
public nudity. Indeed, the ECtHR agreed that public nudity qualified as
a form of expression within Article 10 and that the UK government had
interfered with Gough's rights.117 However, this finding by the court
alone did not resolve the suit in Gough's favor.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Agate, supra note 5.
See Gough v. United Kingdom [2014] App. No. 49327/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ['ii 134].
Agate, supra note 5, at 62-63.
Id. at 63.

Id.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 4, 1950),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Convention for
Protection].
117. Agate, supra note 5, at 63.
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Before it could issue a final ruling, the court assessed whether the
government's interference with Gough's right to freedom of expression
was justified by law, a legitimate aim, or democratic necessity.118 After a
thorough analysis of the question, the court found that the police had
acted against Gough in order to meet "a pressing social need in response
to [his] repeated anti-social conduct."119 Therefore, although Gough's
conduct did align with Article lO's broad definition of "expression," his
actions nevertheless ran afoul of the caveat contained in that same
article, which states that "the exercise· of these freedoms . . . may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary ...for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals .. . ." 120 The Court,
therefore, supported its conclusion by pointing out that
Article 10 did not go so far as to enable individuals to
repeatedly impose their anti-social conduct on other
unwilling members of society and then to claim a
disproportionate interference with the exercise of the
freedom of expression when the state, in the
performance of its duty to protect the public from public
nuisances, enforced the law in respect of such conduct. 121
Thus, the court was satisfied that the government had not unduly
infringed upon Gough's right to freedom of expression. The eccentricity
of Gough's naked crusade---a total diversion from public norms-was
great enough to justify the government's suppression of his chosen form
of protest.
The ECtHR's assessment that public nudity is inherently
expressive, and therefore that the right to freedom of expression does
cover such conduct, is significant. However, Gough's case demonstrates
that this apparent victory for public nudity is ultimately meaningless.
The ECtHR's interpretation of Article 10 and its evaluation of public
nudity as "anti-social" result in nude protests being similarly proscribed
in both the European Union and the United States, despite the
technical difference in their legal status. Additionally, both legal
systems justify governmental limitations on nude protest by citing the
very social values that the nude protests seek to alter. Thus, nude
protests in both systems suffer from a chicken and egg problem: so long
as activists are legally prevented from protesting, they will have a
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
See Gough v. U.K. [2014] App. No. 49327/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ['II 176].
Conuentwn for Protection, supra note 116, art. 10.
See Gough v. U.K. [2014] App. No. 49327/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ['II 176].
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reason to protest. Of course, as the ECtHR pointed out in its decision,
these protestors are still able to advocate using more conventional
means of communication and advocacy. But no court has yet considered
whether the cultural discomfort with the naked human body that lies at
the heart of nude protests is such that it can only be dislodged through
nude advocacy.
IV. DISCUSSION
The female nipple and the male nude present legal systems with
similar challenges. When people use their bodies as vehicles for social
protest, their messages become intentionally inextricable from their
nudity. Thus, this form of protest loses its power if it conforms to the
social norms that legal systems invoke to suppress them. Accordingly, a
legal impasse arises. This section will discuss the similarities as well as
the particularities of how laws intended to ensure freedom of expression
are nevertheless constricted by cultural norms. This note will not,
however, attempt to argue whether people should be allowed to use
their naked bodies as conduits for political and social protest. That
question is not dependent on legal analysis and is therefore beyond the
scope of this paper.
The Spence and O'Brien tests have established interlocking
principles of symbolic speech that effectively eradicate any First
Amendment protection for the female nipple. The former is primarily
concerned with determining whether the symbolic speech at issue is
sufficiently clear as to constitute "speech" at all. Consequently, the
Spence test does not look beyond the speaker's actual conduct. By
contrast, the latter is focused on whether the government is sufficiently
justified in curtailing the symbolic acts at issue. Thus, the O'Brien test
is solely concerned with the government's conduct. Taken together,
these two tests encircle the issue of symbolic speech, allowing courts to
deny First Amendment protection to actions on the basis of both the
nature of the action itself and the validity of the government's response.
Consequently, women engaged in topless protests must convince judges
both that their nipples convey a clear message to onlookers and that the
government has no compelling reason to oblige them to remain fully
clothed.
By contrast, the UK government's response to Gough's nude
protests, and the ECtHR's assessment of that response, is more
straightforward. The UK court evaluated Gough's arrest primarily
according to how others reacted to his behavior. Similarly, the ECtHR
placed a significant emphasis on the tendency of Gough's behavior to
create a situation which would legitimately call for a response by law
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enforcement. The UK and European attitudes are potentially more
permissive than the American response. In practice, however, the
European attitudes are effectively less permissive. Were cultural norms
in a particular European jurisdiction such that public nudity would not
affront the reasonable observer, then the government could not
legitimately prevent a person from using their naked body as an
instrument of protest. Of course, in practice the public's generally
conservative attitude towards nudity is precisely what Gough sought to
protest. It is therefore troubling that the European approach to nude
protests is primarily predicated on ill-defined and unco.dified notions of
public sensibilities and morality, rather than explicit legal standards.
As this note will explore, the clearer standards contained in the
American legal system are nevertheless extremely inept at accounting
for the particularities of female nudity.
Unfortunately for the female nipple, not only are the Spence and
O'Brien tests intertwined with one another, they are also completely
unequipped to account for the particular issue of nipples-as-speech. This
is particularly so with the Spence test because it is predicated on two
implicit assumptions, both of which cut against recognizing topless
protest as symbolic speech.
First, the Spence test assumes that an act or object must already
have acquired specific meaning, independent of the symbolic speech at
issue, in order for conduct to rise to the level of constitutionally
protected symbolic speech. 122 For most people to understand the
speaker's symbolic message, the viewers must first understand the
underlying symbolism conveyed by each element within the message.
There can be no symbolism without symbols, nor can there be
symbols without preexisting meaning. This assumption makes sense in
the context of the flag burning cases that initially established the test.
As the circumstances of Spence and Johnson make clear, the American
flag's preexisting symbolic meaning provided essential context upon
which the plaintiffs could build their own meaning through their own
actions. In each case, there would have been very little, if any, political
message absent the American flag. The test is simply not designed to
contemplate the possibility that symbolic speech can exist absent a
preexisting element of symbolism within the larger symbolic act.
Indeed, the Spence standard is not designed to contemplate the
possibility that an object or action might have multiple, competing
connotations, as is the case with the female nipple.
Unlike the American flag, the female nipple is absent from public
spaces and popular culture. Indeed, public nudity ordinances and
122. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 410.
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western cultural norms have effectively banished the female nipple to
the bedroom, bathroom, and strip club since time immemorial. 123
Although recent advances in lactation law now grant nursing mothers
the right to breastfeed their babies in public, many people still object
even to such limited displays of the female nipple. 124
Despite the efforts of organizations like Free the Nipple, and the
success of the hashtag ''#freethenipple" across social media platforms, 125
the female nipple remains, at best, an enigmatic presence in modern
America. Is the nipple inherently sexual, an obscene dot that cannot
appear in public without eliciting some combination of lust and
repulsion? Or is it a piece of skin like anY. other, albeit rather shriveled,
but not any more loathsome than a nostril or belly button? Or is the
nipple a purely functional orifice, perfectly suited to the purpose of
feeding and mollifying wailing infants? And why are female nipples so
different from their male counterparts? Do male nipples have First
Amendment protection that female nipples lack?126 The very fact that
none of these existential questions on the nature of the female nipple
have simple answers demonstrates that nipples are not inherently
imbued with any single meaning.
The Spence test's assumption results in a cruel irony for women who
want to show their nipples as a form of political protest: so long as
American laws and culture continue to sexualize the female nipple,
women cannot show their breasts in an attempt to alter these societal
and governmental biases. Only when there is no remaining anti-nipple
social stigma will topless protests be able to satisfy the second prong of
the Spence test because only then will the female nipple's public
exposure have an established symbolic meaning. Thus, the Spence test
severely restricts the ability of protestors to use symbolism as a means
of advocating against one meaning and for another.
In this sense, the American approach to the female nipple poses
protesters with the same conundrum that Gough faced in the United
Kingdom. So long as there is a reason to protest, these dissenters will
not be able to protest in the manner of their choosing. The very purpose
of the topless protests at issue in Free the Nipple and Tagami was to
123. Some states have even banned the women from showing their nipples in strip
clubs, and the Supreme Court has upheld such laws as Constitutional and not in violation
of the O'Brien test. See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (holding
Indiana's requirement that dancers wear pasties and a G-string when performing did not
violate the dancers' First Amendment rights).
124. Meghan Boone, Lactation Law, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (2018).
125. Julia Jacobs, Artists Urge Instagram: Free the Nipple!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2019,
at Cl.
126. The author knows of no case that asks whether the First Amendment protects a
man's ability to protest by publicly displaying his nipples.
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protest one type of public perception of the nipple and attempt to
replace it with a different perception. 127 Similarly, Gough repeatedly
stated that his naked rambles were intended to change people's minds
about the human body and convince the public that the body should be
celebrated instead of shamed.128 So long as flag desecration and the
Spence test remain the legal standard against which judges evaluate all
symbolic speech, women will not be able to protest against how the male
gaze has perverted the public perception of the female body. In the
European Union as well, nude protests will almost certainly remain
unprotected so long as the current Article 10 standards remain in place.
The Spence test's second assumption is that symbolic speech can
acquire its meaning through an infinite range of nonverbal acts. The
logic behind this assumption is obvious: if a person must explain the
significance of their act through accompanying explanatory speech, then
clearly the act is not likely to be "understood by those who viewed it." 129
The Supreme Court affirmed this implicit assumption in its decision in
Rumsfeld u. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., stating
that "if the specific message one's nudity is meant to convey would not
be understood without accompanying explanatory speech, that is 'strong
evidence that the conduct at issue ...is not so inherently expressive
that it warrants protection."' 130
This standard is in marked contrast to the European approach, with
its intentionally permissive standard of what constitutes expression.
The European approach limits permissible expressive conduct based on
the expressions' external implications, rather than any inherent failure
of an act to communicate an idea. What the Spence test fails to consider
is that the medium of the protest might limit the types of actions that
the speaker can carry out. An American flag can support a variety of
inventive, even violent actions, thereby allowing the speaker to
creatively tailor her expressive activity to. fit her intended message.
Spence's taped up peace sign conveyed a very different message than
did Johnson's immolation, but both acts were possible because the flag
itself is a medium upon which a wide variety of acts may be performed.
In contrast to the flag, the nature of the female nipple significantly
restricts the types of actions that a person may reasonably commit in
order to convey a nipple-related message. Indeed, the problem of how to
use non-verbal acts in combination with the nipple is complicated by
multiple factors. First, there is the problem of public nudity ordinances.
127. Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 2017); Free the Nipple v.
City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1263 (D. Colo. 2016).
128. See Agate, supra note 5, at 62-63.
129. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 411.
130. 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
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The plaintiffs in both Free the Nipple and Tagami ran afoul of their local
public nudity regulations, despite their attempts to skirt the limits of
the law by using strategic "opaque coverings." 131 Thus, were a woman to
use tape to create a picture over her exposed breasts, just as Spence
used tape to create a peace sign over the American flag, the government
· could still legally suppress her attempt at symbolic speech simply by
enforcing its public indecency laws.
European judges can interpret Article 10 to protect significantly
more nude expressive conduct than their American counterparts. The
European Union only censors speech when allowing it_ would
significantly infringe upon some element of public welfare.132 Therefore,
although Gough's full exposure-totally devoid of strategic coverings or
additional expressive elements-did run afoul of Article lO's catch-all
limiting clause, it is quite likely that a protest of the type attempted by
Tagami would be permissible. However, a European judge could broadly
construe any item on the list of potential justifications to limit
expression. Indeed, Gough's case demonstrates that "the prevention of
disorder or crime" and the "protection of health or morals," can limit
behavior that is not illegal, behavior which merely transgresses social·
norms. 133 There is no strict guide for how significant a person's
transgression must be to justify a government or law enforcement's
censoring of their speech. Therefore, although the European approach
under Article 10 seemingly allows more nude and semi-nude protests, in
practice, this may not be the case. Indeed, Gough's case suggests that it
is not.
The second problem arising from the unique challenges of the nipple
as a medium is of a practical nature. The nipple is part of the body.
Therefore, a woman's ability to convey a specific message with her
breasts is necessarily constrained by her own physical limitations. Had
Johnson merely waived his American flag in front of a crowd of
onlookers and given it a few soft slaps, his message would have been
diluted to say the least. Burning the flag was much more expressive. To
state the obvious, women cannot emulate Johnson by immolating their
breasts without causing themselves considerable pain and life-long
disfigurement.134 Using the body as a medium for protest is
131. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377; Free the Nipple, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1260.
132. Convention for Protection, supra note 116, art. 10.
133. Id.
134. The obvious alternative to a woman burning her own breasts is that she could
instead burn her bra. This is a very well-known form of feminist protest. However,
because of bra burning's infamous role in the second wave of the feminist movement, this
form of protest carries with it its own meaning and connotations. Therefore, it is not a
perfect substitute for women who wish to advocate specifically against gender-biased laws
and social norms that sexualize the female body.
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fundamentally different than the sort of symbolic speech contemplated
in most of the First Amendment's jurisprudence. True, the Court has
considered the naked female body in the context of the First
Amendment.135 But in none of those cases did the Court assess the
female body's ability to communicate a political message. 136 Accordingly,
there is no Supreme Court case law that thoroughly discusses how to
evaluate an individual's symbolic speech communicated through their
breasts.137
Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Colorado district court
considered whether the Spence test was inadequate to assess the value
of the speech at issue in Tagami and Free the Nipple. This oversight is
not entirely surprising. As set forth above, cultural norms and
government regulations uniquely burden the female nipple. The
disjunction between the Spence test and the nipple is unlikely to arise in
most other cases considering symbolic speech. Therefore, the judges in
both of these cases might be forgiven for failing to notice the
fundamental limitations of symbolic speech doctrine.
The outcomes of Tagami and Free the Nipple, however, could point
to something far more insidious: the inability of First Amendment
jurisprudence to account for uniquely female forms of speech. Because
the judges did not interrogate the context and implications of the Spence
test, they unquestioningly applied it to the cases before them. Perhaps
. more observant judges would have treated these cases differently. Due
process should not depend on how sensitive individual judges are to the
unique challenges that women face when trying to effectively
communicate a politically charged message. Regardless of the merits of
the Free the Nipple movement, the Spence test should not be the metric
against which judges assess the value of that movement.
The American and UK perspectives both suffer from an inability to
accommodate novel forms of expressive conduct. The repeated legal
failures of Gough's nude protests are a perfect case in point. In the
United Kingdom, Gough's violation of the vague offense of using
"disorderly behavior ...within the hearing or sight of a person likely to
be caused harassment, alarm, or distress thereby" occurred because the
135. See generally City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (holding that Erie's
public nudity ordinance proscribing nudity in public places did not violate the First
Amendment rights of nude dancers); Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)
(holding Indiana's requirement that dancers wear pasties and a G-string when performing
did not violate the dancer's First Amendment rights).
136. In City of Erie, the Court did state that "there may be cases in which banning the
means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the message,
that is not the case here." 529 U.S. at 293.
137. The Court did state in City of Erie that "being in a state of nudity is not an
inherently expressive condition." 529 U.S. at 289.
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public was not accustomed to his particular mode of expression.
Considered in isolation, nudity is not inherently distressing. Public
nudity is only abnormal because western culture has frowned upon it for
centuries. Therefore, English laws are prepared to condemn public
nudity purely for the sake of tradition and to protect the sensibilities of
those people influenced by that tradition, rather than because Gough's
actual nudity was directly harmful to others. Indeed, the government's
response to Gough's naked body vindicates the very nature of his
protest. Thus, the UK law is fundamentally unable to account for highly
aberrant but otherwise harmless behavior. In this sense, the American
and UK laws' suppression of nude and semi-nude protests are very
similar, despite the underlying causes being quite different.
The O'Brien test poses significant challenges to the argument that
women's topless protests deserve First Amendment protection.
Specifically, the second prong of the test, which permits the government
to regulate symbolic speech if the regulation "furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest," is particularly problematic. 138 In
Tagami, Chicago police charged the plaintiff with violating the city's
public nudity ordinance. 139 Similarly, in Free the Nipple, the plaintiffs
brought suit in order to prevent the government from enacting a public
nudity ordinance that treated male and female nipples differently. 140 In
bo'th cases, the government's justification for imposing regulations that
effectively prevented women from showing their nipples in public was a
central issue. 141
The vague and broadly defined restrictions on freedom of expression
contained in Article 10 pose a problem very similar to the O'Brien test.
Both allow judges to restrict expressive conduct based on very subjective
justifications. The ECtHR's holding against Gough demonstrates the
influence that cultural norms can exert upon an inherently subjective
standard. Despite the lack of danger or harm posed by Gough's naked
body, Article 10 nevertheless empowers judges to apply their own
standards of "disorder" and morality" when they decide whether to
protect a person's expression. Thus,· the legal treatment of politically
motivated public nudity by both the American and European systems is
fundamentally tainted by a significant level of judicial discretion and
subjective judgment.

138. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
139. Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2017).
140. Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1260 (D. Colo. 2016).
141. In Free the Nipple, the court did not apply O'Brien because it did not deem it
necessary to do so once it had determined that topless protest is not First Amendment
protected symbolic speech under the Spence test. Id. at 1263.
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The subjective policy rationales for public nudity ordinances allow
courts to unquestioningly accept government regulations that proscribe
women from publicly showing their breasts. Public nudity ordinances
are predicated on traditional standards of morality and public order. 142
As summarized by the Tagami court, public indecency statutes "reflect
moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in
public places," and "were designed to protect morals and public
order." 143 Notions of morality are inherently subjective. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has a thorough record of recognizing that the
government has a compelling interest in maintaining public morality. 144
Indeed, the Court has stated that "a legislature could legitimately act . .
. to protect 'the social interest in order and morality."' 145 Similarly,
Article 10 specifies that "protection of health and morals" is grounds for
the government to intervene and curtail a person's exercise of their
right to freedom of expression. 146 Thus, when a woman attempts to
communicate by symbolically showing her nipples in public, or a man
attempts to change public attitudes towards nudity, the government has
a ready-made argument sufficient to satisfy Article 10 or the O'Brien
test's requirement that a law "furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest." 147
Of course, few people would dispute the benefits of prohibiting
people from being completely nude in public. In this sense, there is an
important distinction between Gough's conduct and that of the plaintiffs
in Tagami and Free the Nipple. But the vast majority of such ordinances
do not distinguish between a person who is completely naked and a
woman who is only topless. 148 When the Tagami court analyzed
Chicago's public nudity ordinance under O'Brien, it did not question
that the city's rationale for prohibiting people from being publicly nude
was also sufficient for its prohibition against women being publicly
topless. The O'Brien test's comparatively complacent standard
facilitated the Tagami court's permissive approach to the validity of the
city's interest. Topless protests are predicated on the protestor's
dissatisfaction with existing public nudity laws and the entrenched
142. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 379.
143. Id. (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 507 U.S. 560, 569 (1991)).
144. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973); Roth u. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
145. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted).
146. Convention for Protection, supra note 116, art. 10.
147. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
148. As mentioned above, both Tagami and Free the Nipple challenged public nudity
ordinances on Equal Protection grounds in addition to their First Amendment claims.
Tagami, 875 F.3d at 377; Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258,
1264 (D. Colo. 2016). The latter challenge was successful, while the former was not.
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societal sexism that underlies those laws. The net effect of the O'Brien
test on American topless protests illustrates why the European
approach under Article 10 is similarly limiting. Article 10 explicitly
permits local attitudes and customs to percolate through judges'
application of the right to freedom of expression. Thus, it is clear from
both the European and American examples that a legal standard that
allows courts to unquestioningly accept traditional governmental
rationales for speech rights is fundamentally hostile to the nature of
topless and nude protests.
The deficiencies of the O'Brien test expose additional serious
problems within the jurisprudence of symbolic speech. As with the
Spence test, the flaws of O'Brien do not emanate from the demands of
the test itself. Instead, the two tests enable courts to hand down
holdings that further entrench sexism in the law. Although the O'Brien
test requires courts to determine that a governmental interest is
"important" or "substantial" enough to justify its interference with
symbolic speech, Tagami reveals the shortcomings of such precautions.
When symbolic speech challenges the assumptions underlying the
government's interest, the O'Brien test permits courts to completely
elide this critical conflict. True, the nature of topless protests presents
many unique challenges. It would be unreasonable to demand that the
Court craft all of its First Amendment tests to account for the types of
difficulties posed by the female nipple. However, justice is not just for
easy cases. Even if Spence and O'Brien generally lead to correct
outcomes, by their very nature they effectively preclude the female
nipple from receiving any First Amendment protection.
The close parallels between the O'Brien test and Article 10 are the
most important factors to understanding why the legal systems of
Europe and America both prevent nude and partially nude protests.
Both sets of laws allow the social stigma of nudity to permeate the legal
mechanisms designed to facilitate open dialogue and discussion. While
neither legal system prevents people from using verbal and written
speech to communicate their opposition to traditional legal and social
attitudes towards the human body, the plaintiffs in Tagami, Free the
Nipple, and Gough would all likely argue that their nudity itself was an
essential element of their message. So long as judges in the United
States. and Europe consider public nudity to be so shocking as to merit
criminal sanctions, people will remain highly sensitive to such displays
unless nude protestors use their bodies as conduits for their political
speech.
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V. CONCLUSION

How do you solve a problem like the nipple? How do you convince
the public to agree with an idea when the government does not? To
start, courts need to acknowledge that the female nipple is not a flag, or
a piece of clothing, nor a draft card, or a picket sign. The female nipple
is unique. It defies simple categorization and eludes obvious
classification. For these reasons, symbolic speech doctrine is inherently
hostile to the nipple. Judges should not be able to dole out First
Amendment protection on the basis of whether the speaker's message
falls in line with other forms of protected speech. Stare decisis should be
a guide, not a shackle.
Similarly, European laws should be more sensitive to the inherently
subjective standards that they perpetuate. While the European
approach allows countries greater room to tailor EU laws to their own
particular customs, this approach facilitates a fundamentally
conservative approach to social issues. Therefore, although the right to
freedom of expression is seemingly more expansive than the First
Amendment, the practical effect of Article 10 is to diminish the
opportunities for new methods of political speech to an even greater
degree than the First Amendment.
Although the question of whether the First Amendment should
protect topless protests is still open, it is clear that we cannot answer
this question using only the current tests. This is equally true of the UK
and Article lO's treatment of nude protests. Difficult questions demand
critical thought, something which is notably absent in both of the Gough
opinions, as well as the Tagami and Free the Nipple opinions. Solving a
problem like the naked body will require courts to begin by· first
acknowledging that the human form is, from an expressive perspective,
problematic. Rising to this challenge will be one step judiciaries can
take in determining whether First Amendment jurisprudence or EU
human rights law can recognize and eliminate their own tendencies
towards sexism and marginalization. Until then, women will have to
keep taking their tops off, and Steven Gough will have to keep up his
rambling.

